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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two centuries, the courts of the United States have wrestled
with the questions of what effect to give to foreign bankruptcies and whether
or not to recognize the claims of foreign representatives. The reforms of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the U.S. Bankruptcy Code)' provided a
statutory framework to guide the courts in this difficult area involving trans-
national insolvency. Under current law, a foreign representative2 may file a
section 304 petition to commence a case in the United States that is ancil-
* Copyright 1991 by Charles D. Booth. This article substantially expands upon the
historical introduction in Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and
Critique of the Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, to be published at 66 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 135 (1992) [hereinafter Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies].
** Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. B.A., Yale University, 1981;
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984.
1 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at I1 U.S.C.A. (West 1991), in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1991),
and in scattered sections of other titles). Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this
article to "Section" will be to the applicable Section of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
2 Section 101(24) defines "foreign representative" as a "duly selected trustee,
administrator, or other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding." 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 101(23) (West 1991).
1 Section 304 provides:
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under this section by a foreign representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party in interest
does not timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may-
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of-
(A) any action against-
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such foreign
proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect to
such property, or any act or the commencement or continuation of
any judicial proceeding to create or enforce a lien against the
property of such estate;
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(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such
property, to such foreign representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the
court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious
administration of such estate, consistent with-
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such
estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with
the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
11 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West 1991).
Section 304 cases reported to date include In re Gercke, 122 Baikr. 621 (Bankr.
D.D.C. 1991); In re Officina Conti, S.R.L., 118 Bankr. 392 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989); In re
Papeleras Reunidas, S.A. 92 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988); Interpool, Ltd. v. Cer-
tain Freights of M/V Venture Star, 102 Bankr. 373 (D.N.J. 1988), appeal dismissed, 878
F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C., 91
Bankr. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989); In re Lines, 81 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re
Metzeler, 78 Bankr. 674 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Banco de Descuento, 78 Bankr.
337 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Gee, 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re
Trakman, 33 Bankr. 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Angulo v. Kedzep, Ltd., 29 Bankr. 417
(S.D. Tex. 1983); In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re
Egeria Societa Per Azionidi Navigazione, 26 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983), rev'd
sub norn. Ciel y Cia S.A. v. Nereide Societa di Navigazione Per Azioni, 28 Bankr. 378
(E.D. Va. 1983), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ciel y Cia S.A. v. Commissioner of Egeria
Societa di Navigazione Per Azioni, 723 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1983); In re Culmer, 25 Bankr.
621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Egeria Societa Per Azioni di Navigazione, 20 Bankr.
625 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982), rev'd sub nom Ciel y Cia S.A. v. Nereide Societa di Naviga-
zione Per Azioni, 28 Bankr. 378 (E.D. Va. 1983), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ciel y Cia
S.A. v. Commissioner of Egeria Societa di Navigazione Per Azioni, 723 F.2d 900 (4th
Cir. 1983)',n re Stuppel, 17 Bankr. 413 (S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Lineas Areas de Nicara-
gua, S.A., 13 Bankr. 779 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua S.A,
10 Bankr. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Comstat Consulting Servs. Ltd., 10 Bankr.
134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
For detailed analyses of Section 304, see Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies,
supra note *, at Part II.A.; Boshkoff, United States Judicial Assistance in Cross-Border
Insolvencies, 36 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 729, 739-50 (1987); Finister, 1988 Developments and
the Conflicts Arising Under Section 304, 6 Bankr. Dev. J. 345 (1989); Gallagher & Hartje,
The Effectiveness of Section 304 in Achieving Efficient and Economic Equity in Transna-
tional Insolvency, ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 1, 3-21 (1983); Gitlin & Flaschen, The Interna-
tional Void in the Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAW. 307, 315-22 (1987);
Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes, American Reports - United States Treatment of Foreign
Insolvency Proceedings, in CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS
71-88 (I. Fletcher ed. 1990); Given & Vilaplana, Comity Revisited: Multinational Bank-
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lary to a foreign proceeding.4 Rather than file a petition under section 304,
the foreign representative may: (1) file a petition under section 303(b)(4) to
commence an involuntary case against the foreign debtor under chapter 7
(liquidation) or chapter 11 (reorganization);' (2) seek dismissal of a case or
suspension of all proceedings under section 305(a)(2);' or (3) vacate attach-
ruptcy Cases Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 325, 329-40
(1983); Glosband & Katucki, Current Developments in International Insolvency Law and
Practice, 45 Bus. LAW. 2273 (1990); Goldie, The Challenge of Transnational Expecta-
tions and the Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Decrees--The United States Adjustment,
58 BRrr. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 303, 308-23, 329-39 (1987); Lam, Bankruptcy Code Section
304(b) (3): "Other Appropriate Relief" for Multinational Bankruptcy, 16 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 479 (1990); Morales & Deutcsh, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recog-
nition of Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 Bus. LAW. 1573, 1583-97
(1984); Nadelmann, The Bankruptcy Reform Act and Conflict of Laws: Trial-and-Error,
29 Harv. Int'l L.J. 27, 35-46 (1988) [hereinafter The Bankruptcy Reform Act]; Powers &
Mears, Protecting a U.S. Debtor's Assets in International Bankruptcy: A Survey and Propo-
sal for Reciprocity, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 303, 341-46 (1985); Stevens, The
Interpenetration of Foreign Bankruptcy Laws in Domestic Proceedings Under H.R. 8200,
52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 61 (1978); Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49 (1988); Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign
Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L LAW. 1153, 1167-78 (1985); Comment, 1988 Developments and
the Conflicts Arising Under Section 304, 6 BANKR. DEv. J. 345 (1989); Comment, In the
Matter of Toga Mfg. Ltd.: A Step in the Wrong Direction for International Bankruptcy, 2
INT'L PROP. INVESTMENT J. 633, 640-51 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, In the Matter of
Toga]; Note, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Has It Fostered the Development of
an "International Bankruptcy System"?, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 541, 549-73
(1984) [hereinafter Note, Section 304].
4 Section 101(23), in turn, defines "foreign proceeding" as a "proceeding, whether
judicial or administrative and whether or not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country
in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal assets
were located at the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an
estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a
reorganization." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(22) (West 1991).
5 Section 303(b)(4) provides:
(b) An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under Chapter 7 or 11 of this title [I U.S.C.A.
§§ 701 et seq., 1101 et seq. (West 1991)] ...
(4) by a foreign representative of the estate in a foreign proceeding concerning such
person.
Id. § 303(b)(4). See, eg., In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 Bankr. 597, 606,
614-15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (construing Section 303(b)(4) in the context of a Chapter
7 case), aff'd, 115 Bankr. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1991). A foreign debtor may also file a petition under Section 301 to commence a volun-
tary case under Chapter 7 or 11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1991). Creditors may com-
mence an involuntary case under chapter 7 or 11 under Section 303. Id. § 303.
6 11 U.S.C.A. § 305(a)(2), (b) (West 1991). See, e.g., Axona, 88 Bankr. at 607-13.
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ments under state law.7 These remedies presently available to a foreign rep-
resentative under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and state law are not discussed
here. Rather, this article examines the development in the major cases and
scholarly works addressing the recognition of foreign bankruptcies and for-
eign representatives prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Many of
the principles developed over the past two centuries have been incorporated
into the current U.S. statutory regime. These principles, as well as the cases
in which they were originally espoused, are discussed in many of the recent
judicial opinions resolving transnational insolvency issues.
II. CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL
BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS
8
Scholars have developed two approaches to resolve cross-border insol-
vency problems: the "personalist," "unity," or "universality" approach (the
"universality" approach) and the "realist," "plurality," or "territoriality"
approach (the "territoriality" approach).9 The goal of the universality
approach is the simplification and unification of transnational insolvency
proceedings.1" Under this theory, a central bankruptcy proceeding (intended
to resolve all claims against the debtor's estate worldwide) occurs in the
jurisdiction in which the debtor is domiciled or where the debtor's principal
place of business is located. A trustee is appointed in this central proceeding.
To collect the assets of the debtor worldwide and to seek the turnover of all
such assets to the central proceeding, the trustee travels abroad and com-
mences ancillary proceedings in each country in which assets of the foreign
debtor are located. In each of these ancillary proceedings the court gives
effect to the declaration of bankruptcy in the central proceeding, recognizes
the claims of the trustee (foreign representative), and orders the turnover of
all local assets to the central proceeding, as well as applies the substantive
laws of the country in which the central proceeding is occurring. Since the
final adjudication in the central proceeding is to be respected by all jurisdic-
tions, all creditors worldwide must submit claims in the central proceeding
or forever be barred from pursuing their claims."
The primary advantage of the universality approach is equality of distri-
I See, e.g., Victrix Steamship Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.
1987); Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. A.B., 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985).
8 This section is substantially adapted from Booth, Recognition of Foreign
Bankruptcies, supra note *, at Part I.
I See generally J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 403-09, at
565-72 (8th. ed. 1883); L. BLOM-COOPER, BANKRUPTCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 11-12 (1954); Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 631, 633-35 (1980); Powers & Mears, supra note 3, at 305-07;
Unger, supra note 3, at 1154-55.
10 See generally sources cited supra note 9.
I" Unger, supra note 3, at 1154; L. BLOM-COOPER, supra note 9, at 11; Honsberger,
supra note 9, at 633. See also J. STORY, supra note 9, §§ 403-09, at 565-72.
(V/ol. 9:1
TRANSNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES
bution among creditors worldwide, because all claims will be administered
by the same court and under the same law. Moreover, since duplicative pro-
ceedings and litigation are avoided, distributions will most likely be higher
and the administration of claims certainly more efficient, than if each juris-
diction pursued independent, full bankruptcy proceedings. Of course, certain
creditors who would have benefitted from local priorities or preferences in
their home countries are disadvantaged by the universality approach and
might suffer hardship, including inconvenience or extra expense from being
forced to participate in the central proceeding where applicable procedural
and substantive laws may differ from those of their home jurisdiction.'
The contrasting territoriality approach stresses the inherent powers of a
jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to the res or property only within such
jurisdiction. Under this approach, a trustee appointed in the original bank-
ruptcy proceeding is limited to administering assets within his home jurisdic-
tion. Courts in other jurisdictions will not recognize the original declaration
of bankruptcy and will adjudicate claims to the assets of the debtor that are
located in their jurisdictions, often in separate, full bankruptcy proceedings.
Creditors will file claims in the proceedings occurring in the respective
jurisdictions.
The advantages of the territoriality approach are limited to local creditors
who will benefit from local preferences and not suffer the inconvenience or
expense of being compelled to prove their claims abroad under foreign law.
The primary disadvantage of the territoriality approach is that it rejects the
principle of equality of distribution in favor of a regime that rewards the
fastest moving creditors. Of course, the multiplicity of bankruptcy proceed-
ings will result in duplicative administrative expenses (and correspondingly
lower distributions), inefficiency, and a less certain international climate for
transacting business."3
Although the two approaches described above do not exist in a pure form
in any country, they are very useful in structuring the debate about cross-
border insolvency, and specifically the transnational aspects of United States
bankruptcy law. It will be seen that United States courts at first followed the
territoriality approach, but later responded inconsistently to the issues raised
by the recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings and the claims of for-
eign representatives. Finally, a growing number of reported cases in the dec-
ade preceding the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 revealed a trend away
from the parochial use of the territoriality approach and toward increased
cross-border cooperation under either a pro-recognition comity approach or
the universality approach. Moreover, as the United States courts slowly
adapted to a more international and integrated world scene, it became
apparent that the rudimentary nature of the United States statutory and case
law was insufficient to handle the increasingly complicated issues arising in
transnational insolvencies.
12 Unger, supra note 3, at 1154-55.
"3 Id. at 1155; see also Honsberger, supra note 9, at 634-35.
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III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANSNATIONAL ASPECTS OF
UNITED STATES INSOLVENCY LAW14
A. The Early Cases: The Territoriality Approach
An analysis of the transnational aspects of United States insolvency law
must begin with Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the United States Constitu-
tion, which provides that "Congress shall have Power ... To establish...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.""5 During the first century of nationhood, Congress enacted uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies three times-from 1800 to 1803, 1841 to
1843, and 1867 to 1878.1" These early statutes did not address the problems
relating to cross-border bankruptcies, such as what effect to give to foreign
bankruptcy adjudications or whether to allow foreign representatives to
claim assets of nonresident or foreign debtors located in the United States.'7
Moreover, these early statutes did not provide for jurisdiction over nonresi-
dent debtors.' 8 During the many years when the early federal statutes were
not in effect, the states were allowed to enact their own insolvency laws. 9
Therefore, courts in some of the early cases wrestled with the problem of
14 For further, at times conflicting, interpretations of this history, see Boshkoff, supra
note 3, at 732-38; Comment, In the Matter of Toga, supra note 3, at 639-41, 645-49;
Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 3, at 10-11, 15-16; Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes, supra note
3, at 69-71; Honsberger, supra note 9, at 635-36, 663-64, 667-69; Morales & Deutcsh,
supra note 3, at 1575-83; Nadelmann, Codification of Conflicts Rules for Bankruptcy, 30
ANN. SuissE DR. INT'L 57, 84-85 (1974) [hereinafter Conflicts Rules For Bankruptcy];
Nadelmann, The Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 3; Nadelmann, The Lure in
"International Bankruptcies" of Assets Located Abroad, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 431, 435-
36 (1984); Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV.
L. REV. 1025, 1035-39, 1043-45 (1946) [hereinafter The National Bankruptcy Act]; Note,
Section 304, supra note 3, at 544-49; Paskay, Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 on Foreign Debtors and Creditors, 12 STETSON L. REV. 321, 322-36 (1983);
Riesenfeld, The Status of Foreign Administrators of Insolvent Estates: A Comparative
Survey, 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 288, 290-96 (1976); Unger, supra note 3, at 1155-67.
15 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
16 Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803); Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch.
9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, §§ 11, 39, 14 Stat. 517,
521, 536 (repealed 1878).
1' Paskay, supra note 14, at 322. See also Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International
Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11
(1977) [hereinafter Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law].
18 Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law, supra note 17, at 11. See
also Paskay, supra note 14, at 322.
19 The state insolvency laws also did not generally provide for jurisdiction over
nonresident debtors. Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act, supra note 14, at 1035-
36; Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law, supra note 17, at 11;
Paskay, supra note 14, at 322.
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what effect to give to bankruptcies adjudicated in other states,2° as well as in
other countries.
Early on, in adjudicating cases involving the attachment of assets in the
United States made prior to foreign adjudications of bankruptcy, the United
States courts adopted a strict territoriality approach and rejected the claims
of foreign representatives to such assets.Z This hostility is evident in the
early U.S. Supreme Court case of Harrison v. Sterry.2 The case involved
Bird, Savage & Bird, a British partnership that also carried on business in
the United States as Robert Bird & Co.' Bird, Savage & Bird was adjudi-
cated bankrupt in Great Britain in June 1803,' and Robert Bird was adjudi-
cated bankrupt in the United States in December 1803 .' At issue in the case
was a contest for the assets of the partnership in the United States, among
(1) the holder of a deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors' (signed
by Robert Bird on behalf of both Bird, Savage & Bird and Robert Bird &
Co.);' (2) the United States as a creditor of the British firm;' (3) attaching
American and British creditors;' (4) assignees in bankruptcy under the
British commission of bankruptcy (the "British Foreign Representatives");'
and (5) assignees in bankruptcy under the American commission of bank-
ruptcy.3 Chief Justice Marshall ruled that since the assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors was "a fraud on the bankruptcy laws" it was "no bar to the
claim of the United States, or of the attaching creditors."' He ruled that the
United States was entitled to priority with respect to all of the assets.' He
also held that since Robert Bird alone was a bankrupt under United States
law, the claims of the American assignees extended only to Bird's share in
the partnership assets in the United States,3 which amounted to one-third of
20 See, eg., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (reviewing a Louisiana
court's refusal to enforce a discharge in bankruptcy obtained under a New York state
insolvency statute).
21 See J. STORY, supra note 9, §§ 410-423(a), at 573-83. See also Lowell, Conflict of
Laws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors, 1 HARV. L. REV 259, 260 (1888);
Honsberger, supra note 9, at 635; Riesenfeld, supra note 14, at 290; Unger, supra note 3,
at 1156; see also Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809).
1 Harrison, 9 U.S. at 289. See also cases cited in Nadelmann, The National
Bankruptcy Act, supra note 14, at 1036 n.65.
23 Harrison, 9 U.S. at 290.
24 Id. at 293.
25Id.
26 Id. at 289.
27 Id. at 291.
2 Id. at 289.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 301.
3 Id. (pursuant to Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 20, § 5, 1 Stat. 512, 515).
1 Harrison, 9 U.S. at 301-02.
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the total assets. Since the creditors' attachments were void as against the
American assignees, the American assignees would come second in line after
the United States. Thus, the creditors whose attachments were void as
against the American assignees would have to share with the other general
creditors (including those claiming under the avoided deed of assignment,
even though they had not proven their debts in bankruptcy) in any distribu-
tions made by the American assignees.as
In discussing the remaining two-thirds of the property at issue in the case,
Justice Marshall set forth the territoriality principle for which Harrison is so
well known. Marshall held that the liens of the attaching creditors (although
void against the American assignees) were valid against the subsequent claim
of the British Foreign Representatives, "[a]s the bankrupt[cy] law of a for-
eign country is incapable of operating a legal transfer of property in the
United States."'3 Marshall thus set up a two-tiered system in which the
interests of attaching local creditors were protected against foreign repre-
sentatives claiming under foreign bankruptcy law, but not against American
assignees claiming under United States bankruptcy lawY7
In the last paragraph of his decision, Justice Marshall reasoned that after
satisfying the claims of the United States and the attaching creditors from
the two-thirds of the property, any surplus should be distributed among all
general creditors. In furthering this equality among the general creditors
under United States law, dividends paid by the British Foreign Representa-
tives and by the American assignees were to be taken into consideration.
Thus, although Marshall refused to recognize the British adjudication for
the purpose of determining the rights of the British Foreign Representatives
vis-a-vis the rights of the holders of prior attachments, he did recognize the
British adjudication for the more limited purpose of producing equality of
distribution to all general creditors.'s
Almost two decades later, in Ogden v. Saunders,' the U.S. Supreme Court
again followed the territorial approach. In this case, the Court upheld a Lou-
isiana court's refusal to recognize a discharge obtained under a New York
state insolvency act, although on somewhat narrower grounds than those
3 Id. See Riesenfeld, supra note 14, at 291.
I Harrison, 9 U.S. at 302. See Reisenfeld, supra note 14, at 291-92.
1 In his analysis of the attaching creditors' rights, Marshall did not address the issue
of whether the attachments of the American creditors should be treated differently from
those of the British creditors. Since he just referred to "attaching creditors," it appears
that they were to be treated the same. Harrison, 9 U.S. at 301-02. Judge Lowell, writing
in the 1880s, supported this view. Pursuant to his interpretation of the extant American
case law, although attaching American creditors were preferred to foreign
representatives, they were not preferred to attaching foreign creditors. Lowell, Conflict of
Laws, supra note 21, at 261.
1 Harrison, 9 U.S. at 302. See Riesenfeld, supra note 14, at 291-92.
39 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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elucidated by Marshall in Harrison.' This case involved a suit on bills of
exchange in a Louisiana court. The defendant pleaded his prior discharge
under the New York insolvency law.' The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
power of the states to enact their own insolvency laws during those periods
when Congress had not established national insolvency laws.' Although
upholding the constitutionality of the discharge obtained under the insol-
vency law of New York, the Court also upheld the nonrecognition of the
discharge by the Louisiana court.4" In its decision, the Court criticized "the
seeming inconsistency and national bias of the developing British case law"
in favor of the extraterritorial effect of bankruptcies, and instead adopted the
territoriality approach.'
In Justice Story's view, the adoption of this territorial approach by the
United States courts was justifiable. In his Commentaries, he argued that the
principal objection to the universality approach, or in his words, "to the
ubiquity of the operation of the bankrupt[cy] laws of a country,"' was that
the universal operation could be prejudicial to the just rights of the Ameri-
can citizen.' He supported the "American Doctrine" in which the United
States could reasonably prefer American attaching creditors to any foreign
assignee and noted that "no other country has any right to question the
determination." '47 Under Justice Story's interpretation, it followed that the
United States could uphold the rights of local creditors against foreign repre-
sentatives even when the local creditors made their attachments after the
foreign bankruptcy decree;" and there is, in fact, later case support for that
49
Story, however, relying on Ogden, more narrowly interpreted the strict
territoriality language in Harrison.o He argued that Marshall's statement in
Harrison that "the bankrupt[cy] law of a foreign country is incapable of
40 See J. STORY, supra note 9, § 421, at 580; see also Riesenfeld, supra note 14, at 293-
94 (discussing J. Story).
41 Ogden, 25 U.S. at 214.
42 Id. at 264, 272-77, 369.
43 Id. at 357, 369.
4 Riesenfeld, supra note 14, at 293 (discussing Ogden, 25 U.S. at 360).
45 J. STORY, supra note 9, § 410, at 573.
46 Id. §§ 410, 414, at 573, 575; see Nadelmann, Solomons v. Ross and International
Bankruptcy Law, 9 MOD. L. REV. 154, 164 (1946) (citing J. Story).
47 J. STORY, supra note 9, § 410, at 573.
48 Id. §§ 410-14, at 573-75; see also Nadelmann, Conflicts Rules for Bankruptcy, supra
note 14, at 84 (citing J. Story, supra note 9).
49 Nadelmann, Conflicts Rulesfor Bankruptcy, supra note 14, at 84 n.161 (citing Clark
v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935)). See also Lowell, supra note 21, at 261. But see Martyne
v. American Union Fire Ins. Co., 216 N.Y. 183, 110 N.E. 502 (1915) (preferring the
claim of an out of state statutory liquidator over a local creditor who made his
attachment after the commencement of the out-of-state insolvency).
So J. STORY, supra note 9, § 421, at 580 (citing relevant cases). See Riesenfeld, supra
note 14 at 293; Honsberger, supra note 9, at 635.
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operating a legal transfer of property in the United States"'" demonstrated
"that the court [was] examining the point only as between the conflicting
rights of the assignees and those of the attaching creditors, and not in rela-
tion to the bankrupt himself."I In Story's view, transnational insolvency
problems should be resolved in accordance with principles of comity (and
not international law), but "only so far as may be done without impairing
the remedies, or lessening the securities, which our laws have provided for
our own citizens."' Thus, as a matter of comity, United States courts might
recognize the title of foreign representatives, so long as the interests or reme-
dies of U.S. citizens were not impaired. This view represents a more flexible
approach to transnational insolvency problems. Although Story's approach
was still fundamentally territorial in outlook, it acknowledged the legitimacy
of the universal application of insolvency laws in certain situations.'
Story's view of comity as a basis for the recognition of a foreign bank-
ruptcy adjudication was cited and followed in the New York case of In re
Accounting of Waite.' The court in this case not only recognized an English
bankruptcy adjudication, but also ordered the turnover of fuhds to an Eng-
lish trustee for distribution in the English proceeding, after finding that local
creditors would not be prejudiced. This case involved the bankruptcy of Pen-
dle & Waite, a firm doing business in New York and London.' Waite was
an American citizen residing in the United States, and Pendle was an Eng-
lish citizen who lived in England.5 7 In 1881 the New York firm of Haynes &
Sanger made an assignment to Pendle & Waite, and in 1882 Pendle & Waite
filed a petition in England for liquidation by arrangement or composition.'
The composition failed, the firm was adjudged bankrupt, and a trustee was
appointed.5 9
Meanwhile, Waite continued to act as assignee of Haynes & Sanger, but
kept for himself all of the proceeds from the sale of the assets.' Waite peti-
tioned a New York court to settle his accounts as assignee, and the English
trustee intervened claiming that he was entitled to the amounts retained by
Waite and that such amounts should be distributed in the English bank-
ruptcy.61 The lower court ruled that New York did "not recognize the valid-
ity of foreign bankruptcy proceedings to transfer title to property of the
51 J. STORY, supra note 9, § 421, at 580 (citing Harrison, 9 U.S. at 302).
52 Id. See also id § 420, at 579-80; Riesenfeld, supra note 14, at 294.
' J. STORY, supra note 9, § 414, at 575; see also Paskay, supra note 14, at 324
(discussing J. STORY, supra note 9).
5 But see Paskay, supra note 14, at 324 (contrasting Story's approach with the
"parochial philosophy expressed by Justice Marshall in Harrison").
I In re Accounting of Waite, 99 N.Y. 433, 450 (1885).
56 Id. at 436.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 437.
6 Id.
61 Id.
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bankrupt situated [in New York]" 2 and upheld the payments that Waite
had made to himself as assignee.'
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals first noted that because Waite
had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in Eng-
land, he was bound by its ruling." Next, the court stated that there was no
conflict between local creditors and a foreign trustee and that no injustice
would be done to local creditors by ordering a transfer of funds abroad.6
After reviewing the applicable case law, the court stated that although the
statutory title of foreign assignees was not valid in New York "solely by
virtue of the foreign statute,"' the comity of nations justified recognizing the
title of a foreign representative when this could be done without adversely
affecting domestic citizens or creditors, provided also, that such titles were
not in conflict with the laws or the public policy of New York.' Since these
criteria were fulfilled and the recognition would cause no harm to local inter-
ests or policies, the court recognized the English proceedings and ordered
the money Waite had misappropriated to be turned over to the foreign
trustee for distribution abroad to the bankrupt's creditors.c8
B. The Emergence of the Universality Approach
In Waite the court based its use of comity on a lack of harm to United
States creditors under the territoriality approach rather than under the
universality approach. In its decision, the Waite court failed to discuss, or
even mention, Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 9 a U.S. Supreme
Court case decided two years earlier. Gebhard was the first important United
States case to adopt the universality approach in resolving problems arising
in a transnational insolvency setting and to apply a universality-based doc-
trine of comity to the detriment of United States creditors.
The Canada Southern Railway Company was a Canadian corporation
formed by the Canadian government in 1868 to build and operate a railroad
in Ontario.7" The railway issued secured bonds to finance its operations.7" In
the 1870s when it became apparent to the railroad that it would be unable to
meet its interest obligations under the bonds, the company proposed a
scheme of arrangement for the financial restructuring of the company that
62Id. at 437.
6 Id. at 437-38.
4 Id. at 439, 449.
Id. at 439.
6 Id. at 448.
67 Id.
I Id. at 449, 451. See also Irwin v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 30 A. 680 (N.J. Ch.
1897) (applying a territoriality-based notion of comity in this inter-state case involving
the issue of what assistance to grant the domiciliary receiver of an out-of-state company).
69 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
70 Id. at 528.
71 Id. at 528-29.
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involved the exchange of new bonds for existing bonds. 2 The new bonds
would mature later, pay a lower interest rate than the original bonds, and
would not include payment on the past due coupons or extension bonds.
More than two-thirds of the stockholders and three-quarters of the bond-
holders approved a scheme that was subsequently passed and assented to by
the Parliament of Canada.74
Two New York bondholders, however, objected to the arrangement and
refused to exchange their old bonds for the new bonds as approved in the
Canadian scheme. 5 They sued in New York to recover on the bonds and the
railroad company pleaded the scheme of arrangement as a defense. 76 The
circuit court held in favor of the bondholders and the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed.
The New York bondholders asserted that since they had never assented to
the Canadian arrangement, they should not be bound by it, and that the
company, instead, should be bound to the conditions specified in the original
bonds. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that the
New York bondholders were bound by the Canadian arrangement even
though they had never assented to it. The Court first noted that "[t]here is
no constitutional prohibition in Canada against the passage of laws impair-
ing the obligations of contracts."' The Court further noted that the Cana-
dian Parliament approved the scheme of arrangement; that the scheme
resembled a composition in bankruptcy and that in a bankruptcy a person
"must necessarily part with some of the rights which, as an individual, not
affected by his relation to others, he might have retained"; 78 and that the
"corporation [was] created for a public purpose... and was subject to the
exclusive legislative authority of the [Canadian P]arliament."7 9 The Court
also stressed that a large majority of the shareholders and bondholders had
approved the scheme and that the Canadian Parliament had the power to
approve the scheme and to bind all parties to its terms.'
The Court rejected the territoriality contentions of the New York bond-
holders that it would be unfair to force them to litigate their claims in Can-
ada under Canadian law. The Court claimed that "every person who deals
with a foreign corporation impliedly [sic] subjects himself to such laws of the
foreign government, affecting the powers and obligations of the corporation
with which he voluntarily contracts, as the known and established policy [as]
72 Id. at 529-30.
73 Id. at 530.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 531.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 532.
78 Id. at 536.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 538.
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that government authorizes."" x In addition, the court reasoned that the
bondholders could have protected themselves against any unjust legislation
of the Canadian government by refusing to deal with Canadian
corporations.8
2
The principle of equality of treatment of creditors and a more universalist
application of comity also played important roles in the Court's decision. In
his dissent, Justice Harlan maintained that the discharge of the company's
obligation to pay the bonds according to their original terms could have no
extraterritorial effect.'m In support of his position he cited Ogden v. Saunders
and Justice Story's limited notions of comity based on a lack of harm to
United States citizens under United States law.' The majority, however,
rejected Harlan's approach in favor of an approach that was more universal-
ist in outlook and considered the just treatment of all creditors under Cana-
dian law. Thus, rather than protecting the rights of two United States
bondholders, the Court assured that all bondholders of the company, world-
wide, would be treated the same. As the Court explained, the Canadian
scheme of arrangement:
is in entire harmony with the spirit of bankrupt[cy] laws, the binding
force of which, upon those who are subject to the jurisdiction, is recog-
nized by all civilized nations.... Unless all parties in interest, wherever
they reside, can be bound by the arrangement which it is sought to have
legalized the scheme may fail. All home creditors can be bound. What
is needed is to bind those who are abroad. Under these circumstances
the true spirit of international comity requires that schemes of this char-
acter, legalized at home, should be recognized in other countries.'
New ideas gain favor only with a convincing spokesperson, and Judge
81 Id. at 537.
82 Id. at 539.
83 Id. at 544 (Justice Harlan dissenting).
I Id. at 544, 545 (Justice Harlan dissenting). Justice Harlan also noted that the
creditors were not granted "their day in court, with opportunity to show that the
proposed composition should not be made." Id. at 543. The majority opinion never
directly addressed this issue; it is difficult to discern from the opinion whether this was an
issue that the bondholders had raised before the court. However, the court did note that
the two dissenting bondholders "did not take part in the appointment of the joint
committee," id. at 531, perhaps implying that the bondholders had not attempted to
voice their objections to the scheme. The majority opinion also stressed certain examples
of the fairness of the procedure, including that the scheme was approved by a majority of
bondholders and creditors, id. at 530, 538, and that the Canadian Parliament, in
sanctioning the scheme, had the power to consider the "interest of all concerned." Id. at
539.
8 Id. at 539 (emphasis added). Morales and Deutcsh limit the effect of Gebhard to
cases in which "the international corporate debtor can truly be deemed to be serving a
public interest function, or can claim special status as a quasi-governmental entity."
Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 3, at 1579.
For a lengthy discussion of Gebhard and related matters, see Nadelmann,
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John Lowell rose to the task. He articulated a more explicit rationale why
the parochial philosophy expressed in earlier cases such as Harrison should
give way to more universalist notions.' He summarized the state of the law
of the "American Approach," which was that if no local creditor had
attached personal property, the foreign trustee would be recognized and
allowed to take the property, but if local creditors had attached the property,
even if after the date of the foreign decree, the local creditors' attachments
would be upheld." He asserted that "[o]ur motive is to aid our own credi-
tors; but we do it, as it were, underhand, so that we have the discredit of a
want of comity, and fail to reap its full advantages."'
Writing in support of the universality approach, Lowell noted the role
that comity played in prior cases, and stressed an even stronger rationale-
that of equality of distribution. The observations contained in his seminal
article, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments for Creditors,9 written
more than a hundred years ago, still ring true today:
It is obvious that, in the present state of commerce and .of communi-
cation, it would be better in nine cases out of ten that all settlements of
insolvent debtors with their creditors should be made in a single pro-
ceeding, and generally at a single place; better for the creditors, who
would thus share alike, and better for the debtor, because all his credi-
tors would be equally bound by his discharge.'
What is even more striking about Lowell's vision is that he contemplated a
provision whereby a United States court could supervise an ancillary admin-
istration and assist a primary proceeding abroad. As Judge Lowell
explained, "[i]f there is inconvenience in proving debts in a foreign country,
ancillary administration might be granted here, as is done upon the estate of
a deceased person.""1 Lowell concluded his observations by noting that "[i]t
is not . . . our purpose in this article to recommend a general bankrupt
law."" In some of his other writings, however, Lowell did propose changes
in bankruptcy law to further equality of distribution. Perhaps his most
important proposal for reform, adopted in Section 2 of the United States
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (U.S. Bankruptcy Act), was to make the presence of
assets in the United States a basis for jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases.93 This
change enabled creditors or the foreign debtor (but not the foreign represen-
Compositions-Reorganizations and Arrangements-In the Conflict of Laws, 61 HARV. L.
REV. 804 (1948).
1 See Lowell, supra note 21, at 262-64.
87 Id. at 261.
88 Id. at 262.
89 1 HARV. L. REV. 259 (1888).
o Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
91 Id.
92 Id.
11 Section 2 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act invested United States bankruptcy courts with
the jurisdiction to adjudge persons bankrupt:
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tative) to petition for the commencement of a bankruptcy case against a for-
eign debtor with assets in the United States, thereby enabling a trustee to
exercise statutory avoiding powers and invalidate all preferential transfers of
property of the bankruptcy estate made within four months of the com-
mencement of the case and to avoid attachments that would have been
upheld under nonbankruptcy law. In other words, this change enabled
United States bankruptcy proceedings to cooperate with foreign proceedings
to further the universality principle of equal distribution of assets to all
creditors.'
C. U.S. Supreme Court Allows Territoriality to Strike Back: Upholding
the Right of States to Apply a Narrow Notion of Comity
In the famous 1895 case of Hilton v. Guyot,9s the U.S. Supreme Court
retreated from the more expansive universality principles emerging in Geb-
hard and the writings of Loweil. In Hilton, the liquidator of a French firm
sued two United States citizens, Henry Hilton and William Libbey, to
enforce a judgment recovered in a French court for their debts to the defunct
who have had their principal place of business, resided, or had their domicile
within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six months, or the
greater portion thereof, or
who do not have their principal place of business, reside, or have their domicile
within the United States, but have property within their jurisdictions, or
who have been adjudged bankrupt by courts of competent jurisdiction without the
United States and have property within their jurisdictions.
U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541 § 2(a)(1), 30 Stat.
545. See Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act, supra note 14, at 1035-39 (discussing
Lowell's proposal contained in Section 106 of the Lowell Bill, S. 1382, 47th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1882)); Nadelmann, Conflicts Rules for Bankruptcy, supra note 14, at 75-76, 84.
In 1938, the first part was amended as follows:
who have had their principal place of business, resided, or had their domicile
within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six months, or for a
longer portion of the preceding six months than in any other jurisdiction.
U.S. Bankruptcy Act, § 2(a)(1), 52 Stat. 842 (1938). See Nadelmann, The National Bank-
ruptcy Act, supra note 14, at 1038.
Regarding the ability of a trustee in a bankruptcy commenced in the United States to
claim assets located abroad, the situation was less clear under U.S. Bankruptcy Act. Pro-
fessor Nadelmann argued that a trustee could claim assets abroad, id. at 1029-31, but
noted that it would be helpful if the U.S. Bankruptcy Act more explicitly stated that
United States trustees were vested with title to property located abroad. Id. at 1030-31.
See U.S. Bankruptcy Act, § 70(a)(5), 30 Stat. 566 (1898) (amended 1938); Id. § 7(a)(5),
52 Stat. 847 (1938). This clarification, in fact, was made in the 1952 amendments to the
U.S. Bankruptcy Act. Pub. L. No. 82-456, 66 Stat. 420 (1952). See Nadelmann, Revision
of Conflicts Provisions in the American Bankruptcy Act, I INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 484 (1952)
[hereinafter Revision of Conflicts Provisions]; Honsberger, supra note 9, at 660.
94 See, ag., supra text accompanying notes 200-60. See also Nadelmann, Revision of
Conflicts Provisions, supra note 93, at 490; Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International
Bankruptcy Law, supra note 17, at 11.
11 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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French firm.' The Court began its analysis by looking to the law of nations
and to private international law. Given the absence of a treaty or statute, the
Court examined the case law.' In the Court's view, the basic principle of
international law was that "[n]o law has any effect, of its own force, beyond
the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived." ' There-
fore, "[t]he extent to which the law of one nation .. shall be allowed to
operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon what our
greatest jurists have been content to call 'the comity of nations.' " The
Court continued:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obliga-
tion, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the
other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its terri-
tory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, hav-
ing due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protec-
tion of its laws."00
The difficulty, of course, is determining when such recognition should be
made. The defendants asserted that the French judgment should not be
enforced because it was obtained through a trial with different procedures
than those in the United States-for instance, one of the plaintiffs was not
permitted to testify under oath and was not subject to cross-examination by
the defendants. But the Court was "not prepared to hold that the fact that
the procedure in these respects differed from that of our own courts [was], of
itself, a sufficient ground for impeaching the foreign judgment."10' The
Court next addressed the possibility of impeaching the foreign judgment for
fraud, but found it unnecessary to do so:
because there is a distinct and independent ground upon which we are
satisfied that the comity of our nation does not require us to give con-
clusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France; and that ground
is, the want of reciprocity, on the part of France, as to the effect to be
given to the judgments of this and other foreign countries.10 2
Under the court's reciprocity-based view of comity, foreign judgments ren-
dered in countries that review United States judgments on the merits "are
96 Id. at 114.
97 Id. at 163.
98 Id.
9 Id.
100 Id at 163-64.
101 Id. at 205.
102 Id. at 210. Similarly, Story acknowledged the relationship between comity and
reciprocity. J. STORY, supra note 9, § 414, at 575. The debate about whether comity
should be dependent on reciprocity continues to this day in regard to Section 304, as well
as in regard to state law. See, e.g., Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, supra note
* at Part II.A.4.; Boshkoff, supra note 3, at 734; Powers & Mears, supra note 3, at 346-51;
Note, Section 304, supra note 3, at 556-57.
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not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this coun-
try, but are prima facie evidence only."" a This view of comity was much
more protective of local creditor interests than that of Gebhard.
Thirteen years after Hilton, the U.S. Supreme Court again interpreted
comity quite narrowly in Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit,"M a case in which
the Court upheld a United States creditor's attachment of property in Wis-
consin over a foreign creditor's prior attachment. In August 1901, the Dis-
conto Gesellschaft, a German bank, garnished the First National Bank of
Milwaukee for the amount of $6,420 owed by the bank to Gebhard Ter-
linden to recover damages in tort."~ Terlinden was a German resident who
absconded from Germany to Wisconsin in July 1901.1' A month later he
was apprehended as a fugitive from justice and later extradited to Ger-
many.1°7 The defendant, Augustus Umbreit, a citizen of Wisconsin, inter-
vened in the case, having also served a notice of garnishment on the First
National Bank of Milwaukee in March 1904 for the amount of $7,500, to
recover a judgment debt owed by Terlinden to him.:°s
In July 1901, bankruptcy proceedings in Germany were commenced
against Terlinden.' A trustee was appointed and granted permission to Dis-
conto Gesellschaft to try to recover, on behalf of the bankruptcy estate in
Germany, the amount it had previously garnished from the First National
Bank of Milwaukee. n °
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled in favor of its citizen Umbreit,
even though Umbreit's claim and garnishment arose after the garnishment
by the German bank." The court reasoned that the fact that the German
bank would remove the garnished assets to Germany to be distributed to
German creditors "was against the public policy of Wisconsin, which for-
bade such discrimination as against a citizen of that State." 12
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to protect its local creditor before satisfying the claim of a foreign
creditor on behalf of a prior bankruptcy adjudication abroad. The Court
noted that:
'o3 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 227 (emphasis added). In contrast, foreign judgments rendered
in countries that give full credit and conclusive effect to the judgments of United States
courts should be held conclusive on the merits when sued upon in the United States. This
was the holding in Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235, 242 (1895), a case involving a
Canadian judgment and decided on the same day as Hilton. For further discussion of
Ritchie, see Goldie, supra note 3, at 305-07 n.14, 328.
104 208 U.S. 570 (1908).
105 Id. at 574-75.
106 Id. at 576.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 575-76.
109 Id. at 576.
110 Id at 576-77.
"' Id. at 577.
112 Id. at 578.
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what property may be removed from a State and subjected to the claims
of creditors of other States is a matter of comity between nations and
states and not a matter of absolute right in favor of creditors of another
sovereignty, when citizens of the local state or country are asserting
rights against property within the local jurisdiction."
In support of this proposition, the Court cited the definition of comity from
Hilton, as well as the writings of Justice Story, 4 yet ignored the equality of
distribution principle and did not refer to Gebhard. The German govern-
ment reacted to this decision by protesting to the United States government
and threatening retaliation."S However, as one commentator points out, the
local creditor benefitted at the expense of the creditors of the foreign estate
because the German bankruptcy administration mishandled the case: "If
instead of trying to remove the assets from the United States, the German
creditors had secured a bankruptcy declaration in the United States, the
local assets would have been equally distributed among all creditors, local
and distant."" 6 This was one of the very situations that Lowell's reforms
were intended to address. Disconto Gesellschaft is important for yet another
reason. In a non-bankruptcy case, it "leaves each state free to decide what, if
any, type of co-operation will be forthcoming when a cross-border insol-
vency law occurs. '"" 7
In 1935 in Clark v. Wiliard," the U.S. Supreme Court relied on Disconto
Gesellschaft in a matter arising at the state, rather than the international,
level involving the Montana assets of an insolvent Iowa corporation. The
Insurance Commissioner of Iowa, as the official liquidator of the Iowa cor-
poration, asserted that his rights should have priority over the later execu-
tions of several local creditors." The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
Montana court's protection of its own creditors even after acknowledging
that by so doing the race of the swiftest would prevail over notions of equal
distribution.' ° The Court's rationale was that it was up to the state courts to
determine "whether there was any local policy, expressed in statute or deci-
sion, whereby the title of a statutory successor was to be subordinated to
213 Id at 578-79. Later in its opinion the court reiterated "the well-recognized rule
between states and nations which permits a country to first protect the rights of its own
citizens in local property before permitting it to be taken out of the jurisdiction for
administration in favor of those residing beyond their borders." Id. at 582.
114 Id. at 579. (citing Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163, and J. STORY, supra note 9, § 33).
11 Nadelmann, Legal Treatment of Foreign and Domestic Creditors, II LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 696, 700 (1946).
116 Id See also Bank of Buffalo v. Vesterfelt, 232 N.Y.S. 2d 783 (1962) (stating that it
was not compelled by principles of comity to recognize Canadian bankruptcy proceedings
and upholding garnishment by local creditor after the commencement of a bankruptcy
under Canadian lam).
117 Boshkoff, supra note 3, at 733.
118 294 U.S. 211 (1935).
119 Id. at 212.
120 Id.
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later executions at the suit of local creditors."' The Court noted that the
states had responded inconsistently to this problem: some states, such as
New York, "prefer a rule of equal distribution," at times subject to certain
conditions, and that other states, notably California, Iowa, and Kentucky,
instead "give the local creditor a free hand."1 22 In this case, the "Supreme
Court of Montana would speak the final word" -- and the word was that
the local creditors should prevail over the statutory successor to the corpora-
tion and "that the writs [of execution would] not be halted though the effect
of the levy may be waste or inequality."'  The Court held that the statutory
successor "must submit.., to the mandate of the sovereignty that has the
physical control of what he would reduce to his possession."' Thus,
although cases under the U.S. Bankruptcy Act furthered equality of distri-
bution, in Disconto Gesellschaft and Clark, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the right of the states in non-bankruptcy cases to enforce territoriality princi-
ples over universality principles, even when such enforcement might lead to
a race of the swiftest and result in inefficiency and inequality. Of course, the
States remained equally free to apply the universality rule of equal distribu-
tion, as did the New York court in Martyne v. American Union Fire Ins.
Co.' (a case involving the claim of a statutory successor), but the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to mandate the application of such a rule.
D. Universality Reprise: Promoting Cross-Border Cooperation and
Equality of Distribution in Two Important Insolvency Cases'
As noted earlier, in non-bankruptcy cases where foreign representatives
claimed assets not attached by local creditors, the courts, following a territo-
121 Id.
122 Id. at 214-15 (citations omitted).
1n Id. at 212.
124 Id. at 213.
's Id. at 214.
. 216 N.Y. 183 (1915). In this case, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed an
order to set aside the post-dissolution attachment by a local creditor against property
claimed by the insurance commissioner of Pennsylvania as a statutory liquidator. The
court acknowledged the principle "that the title of a receiver or assignee to property
obtained by order of a court pursuant to insolven[cy] or bankruptcy laws of a foreign
state has no extraterritorial force or authority and will not be sustained outside the limits
of boundaries of a state as against a valid attachment levied upon such property," id. at
192, but then differentiated the case at bar by noting that the insurance commissioner of
Pennsylvania was a statutory liquidator, whose title could therefore be recognized. Id. at
192-93. In allowing the Pennsylvania liquidator to claim the property, the court followed
a universality approach and noted that to uphold the local creditor's attachment would
enable him to gain a preference at the expense of the foreign corporation, id. at 194, and
thereby at the expense of the other creditors. The court also stressed the earlier noted
principle (as did the Gebhard court) that "[e]very person dealing with the [foreign]
corporation did so with the knowledge of its charter and its charter rights." Id. at 193.
127 For a case in which a foreign representative tried to assert rights to real property,
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riality approach, were generally cooperative, recognized foreign representa-
tives and permitted them to take local assets back to primary proceedings
abroad.'m However, in two insolvency cases not involving local attachments,
In re Stoddard and Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.1m ("Norske Lloyd") and In re
Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll"s ("Kreuger & Toll"), the courts deviated from
this approach, which justified cooperation solely on the basis of territoriality-
based notions of comity, and instead cooperated with foreign proceedings on
the basis of a more flexible approach that was also rooted in certain univer-
sality notions. In Norske Lloyd, a New York court ordered the transmittal of
the local assets of an insolvent foreign insurance company in possession of
the Superintendent of Insurance to a foreign representative for distribution
abroad. This case involved the Norske Lloyd Insurance Company, Ltd.
(Norske Lloyd), a Norwegian insurance company that also did business in
New York.'' In accordance with New York law, Norske Lloyd deposited
certain assets with the appropriate authorities.' Subsequently, Norske
Lloyd became insolvent-a primary receiver was appointed in Norway and a
liquidator in England, and the Superintendent of Insurance fook control of
the assets in New York.l"s Three classes of claimants asserted claims to these
assets: (1) United States residents or citizens issued policies by agencies of
Norske Lloyd doing business in the United States; (2) United States resi-
dents issued policies by Norske Lloyd outside the United States; and
(3) nonresidents of the United States issued policies by foreign agencies of
Norske Lloyd outside the United States.1 4
The Norwegian receiver and the British liquidator claimed that after pay-
ing off the first class in accordance with New York law, the Superintendent
of Insurance should transfer the surplus to Norway for distribution.ls 5 The
New York Court of Appeals agreed and held that after satisfying the claims
of class (1) above, the Superintendent of Insurance had to transfer the sur-
see In re Estate of Delahanty, 11 Ariz. 366 (1908) (assistance to foreign representative not
excluded to land).
M2 See, e.g. text accompanying supra notes 87-88 and discussion of Waite
accompanying supra notes 55-68. See also Finchan v. Income for Certain Trust Funds of
Cobham, 81 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1948) (relying on the territorial-based notions of comity in
Waite, the court upheld the title of a British trustee to personal property in New York
after finding that no injustice to local citizens or conflict with New York public policy
would result).
11 242 N.Y. 148 (involving the administration of assets under New York insurance
law).
130 20 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938) (decided under
U.S. Bankruptcy Act).
131 Norske Lloyd, 242 N.Y. at 154.
132 Id. at 154-55.
13 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 155-56.
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plus of funds to the Norwegian receiver." In reaching its holding, the court
considered the doctrine of comity in a territoriality sense and equated argu-
ments based on comity with arguments in favor of protecting local creditors.
The case did not involve a dispute as to assets between a foreign receiver and
local creditors holding liens.13 Accordingly, the court noted that they knew
of no "principle of equity, comity or public policy" that authorized the pay-
ment in full of local creditors before transferring the surplus abroad."
However, in its discussion of the ancillary nature of the proceeding in
New York and of the principle of equality of distribution, the Norske Lloyd
court espoused some universality principles. For example, the court
described how the Superintendent was an ancillary receiver "who has been
appointed in aid of and in subordination to a foreign receiver for the purpose
of collecting and taking charge of the assets of the insolvent corporation in
the jurisdiction where he is appointed."'"8 Additionally, the court stressed
that the principle of equality of distribution among similarly situated credi-
tors justified the transfer of funds to the Norwegian receiver to be distributed
pro rata to all creditors of Norske Lloyd:
All creditors of a corporation wherever residing are entitled in case of
insolvency to have the general assets distributed among them upon
principles of perfect equality. The courts of one State have no right to
favor domestic creditors in the distribution but it must be made upon
the principle that equality is equity.'
After ordering that the surplus funds be sent to the primary proceeding
abroad, the court ensured that "domestic assets will not as against domestic
creditors be transmitted to a foreign receiver or liquidator if there is any
danger that the latter's distribution thereof will be made in a manner unfair
to the domestic creditors.""' The court acknowledged that there was no
evidence that local creditors "would suffer from any unfair methods adopted
by the foreign receiver."' However, the court found that it would be unfair
to require many of the local policyholders with small claims to incur the
expenses of presentation and proof abroad, and therefore conditioned the
transmittal of the funds abroad on the Norwegian proceedings' granting the
holders of such small claims the opportunity to prove and defend their
claims in the United States.' Overall, although the Norske Lloyd decision is
136 Id. at 166-68.
137 Id. at 163-64.
138 Id. at 163.
139 Id. at 164. By claiming that the ancillary receiver should not thwart the purposes
of the primary receivership, the court also supported the economical and expeditious
administration of the foreign proceedings. Id.
140 Id. at 165 (citation omitted).
141 Id. at 167.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 167-68.
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still rooted in territorial notions of comity, it also espouses universality
notions of equality of distribution and ancillary administration.
In the second case, In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, the court based its
cooperation in the transnational insolvency context even more fully on
universality notions. 1' In March 1932 Swedish liquidation proceedings were
commenced against Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll (Kreuger & Toll),"4 also
known as the "Match King." Kreuger & Toll was organized under the
Swedish Companies Act and had a capital structure consisting of ordinary
shares, participating debentures, and secured debentures.' In June 1932
several American creditors who owned some of the secured debentures filed
a bankruptcy petition in the United States.147 At first, the Swedish liquida-
tors and principal creditor groups opposed the American adjudication on the
grounds "that the bankruptcy, being an international one, should be unified
and concentrated in Stockholm."' 4 Judge Julian M. Mack of the District
Court for the Southern District of New York responded to these objections
by ensuring that "any action taken by this court will be taken with a view to
the most earnest cooperation with the authorities in Sweden in the interest of
all creditorn" 4 9 The court added that the administration of assets in the
United States "would be without any thought of preferential treatment of
American creditors unless indeed preferential treatment were given in Sweden
as against American creditors" and that the United States court in dealing
with local assets "would be not only justified but morally and doubtlessly
legally compelled to accord the same treatment to Swedish and other credi-
tors as it would accord to American creditors."' Relying on Judge Mack's
statements, the Swedish creditors and liquidators dropped their objections to
the American proceedings. 1 ' The promised cooperation between the Ameri-
can and Swedish authorities resulted in accumulation of US $3,500,000 in
the United States bankruptcy estate. 52 At that point the issue of how to
distribute these funds arose.
Lee Higginson, as trustee for the holders of the participating debentures,
had filed a claim for payment on the participating debentures."5 Two years
later, after a series of appeals, the Swedish Supreme Court, the highest court
in Sweden, held that "on liquidation in bankruptcy, holders of the 'Partici-
1 20 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938).
145 Id. at 965.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
14' Id. (quoting Judge Mack)(emphasis original).
1' Id. at 965 (quoting Judge Mack)(emphasis original).
151 Id. at 965-66.
152 Id. at 966.
153 Id. at 967.
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pating Debentures' were to be paid out of the assets of the company before
shareholders, but after all the other debts of the company had been paid."'"
The issue before the district court was what effect to give the Swedish
Supreme Court's judgment. Discussing comity, the court considered the
conflicting interpretations of Hilton v. Guyot.1' The court noted that the
majority of courts treated the foreign judgment as prima facie evidence, but
that other courts treated the judgment as conclusive." The court also noted
that some earlier cases had adopted the reciprocity approach in Hilton, but
then quoted Judge Learned Hand's clarification:
Whatever may be thought of that decision, [Hilton v. Guyot], the court
certainly did not mean to hold that an American court was to recognize
no obligations or duties arising elsewhere until it appeared that the
sovereign of the locus reciprocally recognized similar obligations
existing here. That doctrine I am happy to say is not part of American
jurisprudence157
Rather than blindly following the view espoused in Hilton that a foreign
judgment is prima facie evidence only, the court stated that whether adopt-
ing either the narrow approach or the more universalist interpretation, it was
"convinced that at bar a far stronger case for recognition of the Swedish
judgment [was] presented than in Hilton v. Guyot."' In so finding, the court
mentioned that no question had been raised regarding the jurisdiction of the
foreign court, the propriety and impartiality of the Swedish proceedings, or
any assertion of fraud. 5a Next, the court stated that it had not found "any
clear and convincing evidence that the question was erroneously decided by
the Swedish court."' ' In addition, the court noted that it was Lee Higginson
who had invoked the jurisdiction of the Swedish courts and that the United
States bondholders had received a full and fair opportunity to present their
case there. 16 Moreover, the court relied on an earlier case for the proposi-
tion similar to that espoused in Gebhard: "When citizens of this country
engage in an enterprise in a foreign country with respect to property there
situated, they subject themselves to the laws, decisions, and decrees of its
courts respecting such property and property rights "162
Lastly, in reaching its decision the court addressed the issues of whether
the Swedish judgment was contrary to United States public policy or
whether there had been any valid reason advanced why the Swedish judg-
154 Id. (emphasis original).
Im Id. at 969 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)).
'5 Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. at 969.
l17 Id. (quoting Judge Hand, Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
300 F. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), aff'd, 267 U.S. 22 (1925))(emphasis original).
11 Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. at 969.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 969-70.
161 Id. at 970 (citation omitted).
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ment should not be enforced. In answering both of these questions in the
negative, the court found that it was not the Swedish judgment that was
contrary to public policy, but rather that the American debenture holders'
arguments were contrary to public policy-that to allow their claims would
be to give them preferential treatment to the detriment of the general credi-
tors of Kreuger & Toll. Thus, the district court judge granted comity to the
Swedish judgment and noted that "it is incumbent upon me to carry out
Judge Mack's desire of co-operation between the Swedish liquidators and
our own, provided I can do so in good conscience and in accordance with
equitable principles."1 "3 In recognizing the Swedish judgment, the Kreuger &
Toll court, like -the Norske Lloyd court, upheld the equality of distribution
principle over the parochial claims of the United States creditors. However,
unlike the Norske Lloyd court, the Kreuger & Toll court sidestepped the
issue of what theory of comity it was applying and instead rooted its holding
more completely in universality principles.
E. Into the 1970s: Territoriality Language, but Universality'Policy - The
Emergence of a Pro-Recognition Comity Approach
In a growing number of reported cases in 1969 and onwards, many courts,
although stating the comity test in terms of the protection of local creditors,
began to accord comity to foreign bankruptcies and to grant the relief
requested by foreign representatives."6 Two of these cases, Waxman v.
163 Id. For another case in which bankruptcy proceedings were commenced against a
foreign debtor in the United States after proceedings were commenced against the foreign
debtor abroad, see In re Neidecker, 82 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1936).
'-1 See Waxman v. Kealoha, 296 F. Supp. at 1191 (D. Haw. 1969) (granting
recognition to a Canadian decree and allowing a Canadian trustee in bankruptcy of a
Hawaiian corporation to bring an action in Hawaii against Hawaiian citizens who were
incorporators and stockholders of the corporation); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d
624 (2d Cir. 1976) (granting comity to a Canadian judgment and allowing a Canadian
trustee in bankruptcy to obtain records located in New York offices of bankrupt
Canadian corporations); In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463, 469 (10th Cir. 1976)
(holding that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in not granting comity to the
orders of Luxembourg and Netherlands Antilles courts appointing liquidators and
trustees of two international investment trusts, thereby wrongly preventing these trusts
from voting their claims in the election for the trustee of the debtor undergoing
liquidation in the United States); IIT v. Cornfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(dismissing claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but first stating that "comity
and practical sense require[d] recognition"); Cornfeld v. Investor Overseas Servs., Ltd.,
471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (granting comity to Canadian bankruptcy
proceedings and dismissing an indemnity action brought by a former officer and director
of a Canadian corporation undergoing reorganization in Canada against his former
company), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979).
But see Bank of Buffalo v. Vesterfelt, 232 N.Y.S. 2d 783, 785 (1962) (refusing to grant
comity to Canadian bankruptcy proceedings because to do so "would jeopardize the
rights of a local creditor" who had garnished the wages of a Canadian debtor after the
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Kealoha"' and Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen," exemplify the different ways in
which courts in the United States, although continuing to apply "protection
of local interests" terminology, began to limit the effect of the territoriality
principle and to adopt a more universality-oriented, pro-recognition comity
approach.
Waxman involved an action in the U.S. District Court for Hawaii brought
by a Canadian bankruptcy trustee of a Hawaiian corporation to recover
amounts owed by Hawaii citizens who were incorporators and stockholders
of the corporation. 67 To resolve the issue of whether the court had jurisdic-
tion over the parties and whether to allow the Canadian trustee to maintain
his suit, the court briefly reviewed several different interpretations of comity:
(1) the traditional rule that a trustee may not as a matter of right maintain
an action in a foreign jurisdiction to recover assets;" (2) the rule that com-
ity was dependent on reciprocity; 69 and (3) the fair play and justice rule,
whereby if United States citizens have subjected themselves to foreign laws
and have had the opportunity for a full and fair hearing, the foreign judg-
ment will be upheld unless abuse is shown to have existed.' 70 As in Kreuger
& Toll, the court in Waxman did not adopt and apply one of these
approaches. Instead the court simply stated:
United States courts, both state and federal, have taken the position
that comity will be extended in situations such as the one at bar, unless
to do so would prejudice local creditors and citizens. Defendant has
failed to show that any local creditors would be prejudiced by extending
comity to the Canadian decree. In fact, neither party has alleged the
existence of any local creditors. Defendants have not shown why any
defenses for non-payment of the stock subscriptions could not be ade-
quately advanced here as they would be in some other court.171
In allowing the Canadian trustee's action to continue, the court phrased
the test in terms of "prejudice to local creditors and citizens," but seemed to
apply the test half-heartedly and not to analyze closely the facts of the case.
debtor commenced Canadian bankruptcy proceedings). For a 1970s case in which a
court refused to recognize a foreign proceeding that violated the notions of justice and
fairness under United States law, see Deltec Banking Corp., Ltd. v. Compania Italo-
Argentina de Electricidad, S.A., N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 3, 1974, 171 N.Y.L.J. 2
(summarized in 68 AM. J. INT'L. L. 741 (1974)), aff'd 362 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (1974).
16 296 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Haw. 1969).
166 544 F.2d 624 (2d. Cir. 1976).
167 Waxman, 296 F. Supp. at 1191.
16 Id. at 1193. It is interesting that much of the opinion seeks to show that the
"traditional rule" had been undermined over the years, given that commentators had
reached that same conclusion as early as a century before. See Lowell, supra note 21, at
260; J. STORY, supra note 9, § 420, at 579-80.
169 Waxman, 296 F. Supp. at 1149.
170 Id. (citing Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, 33 F.2d 667 (lst Cir. 1929)).
17' Id. at 1194 (citations omitted).
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Although the court noted that no local creditors existed, and therefore could
not be prejudiced, the court never addressed whether the defendants, all of
whom were Hawaii citizens, would be prejudiced if the court extended com-
ity to the Canadian decree. For instance, the court's opinion failed to con-
sider whether the defendants (who were incorporators and stockholders of
the defunct company) had participated in the Canadian proceedings and had
received the opportunity to be heard in those proceedings; whether the
Canadian proceedings could be collaterally attacked; or whether any actions
had been taken in Canada that were contrary to the defendants' interests.
The principal territoriality factor stressed by the court (in addition to finding
that no local creditors existed) was that the court ordered the Canadian
trustee to notify potential local creditors of the proceedings to enable them
to intervene and assert that their interests were adversely affected.17 Overall,
the court furthered a pro-recognition comity approach by not strictly apply-
ing territoriality terminology.' 73
The decision in Clarkson, in comparison, more explicitly limited the appli-
cation of territoriality principles by narrowly construing territoriality fac-
tors. In this case a Canadian bankruptcy trustee brought suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York to obtain records
located in the New York offices of two bankrupt Canadian corporations.'74
The defendants were officers of the corporations and had custody or control
of the records in question. In the court's view, the central issue was whether
the Canadian bankruptcy proceeding could be collaterally attacked.175 The
court first set forth a traditional interpretation of comity based on Hilton v.
Guyot under which "New York courts recognize the statutory title of an
alien trustee in bankruptcy, as long as the foreign court had jurisdiction over
the bankrupt and the foreign proceeding has not resulted in injustice to New
York citizens, prejudice to creditors' New York statutory remedies, or viola-
tion of the laws or public policy of the state.""11 But the court quickly lim-
ited this protection for local creditors by noting that "[t]hese exceptions are
construed especially narrowly when the alien jurisdiction is, like Canada, a
sister common law jurisdiction with procedures akin to our own,"and cited
Waxman as an example of a case in which a United States court recognized
a Canadian trustee.'"
Unlike the Waxman court, the Clarkson court addressed a variety of fac-
tors before granting recognition to the Canadian judgment. First of all, the
court required that any allegations of fraud would have to be pled "with
172 Id at 1194-95.
173 For a interpretation of the case, see Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 3, at 1580 and
Unger, supra note 3, at 1162.
174 Clarkson, 544 F.2d at 626.
175 Id. at 629.
176 Id. (citation omitted).
177 Id at 629-30.
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particularity"'" s and offer "[c]lear and convincing evidence of fraud... in
order successfully to attack [the] foreign judgment."'7" The court found that
the defendants had failed to meet this burden.sa Next, in regard to the
defendants' argument that "New York public policy ha[d] been violated
because the Canadian court did not give sufficient weight to New York
[law]," the court held that the defendants had "had further opportunities to
argue this point [in Canada] but failed to take advantage of them... [and
that] there [wa]s no indication that the [Canadian] court gave [defendants]
less than a full opportunity to present these questions, or less than full con-
sideration to those aspects of New York law and public policy which were
presented.''
By narrowly construing exceptions to the application of comity in cases
involving "sister common law jurisdictions," requiring that allegations of
fraud be pled with particularity, and considering the overall fairness of the
Canadian proceedings (both in allowing defendants the opportunity to be
heard and in having procedures similar to those of the United States),l"m the
Clarkson court further narrowed the application of a territoriality based
notion of comity, and instead espoused the beginnings of a more pro-recog-
nition, more universality based comity approach."t
F. Herstatt, IBB, and Finabank- Reaching the Zenith of the Pre-U.S.
Bankruptcy Code Universality Approach and the Need for
Reform
As demonstrated by the cases above, courts throughout the United States
responded inconsistently over the years to issues involving the recognition of
foreign insolvency proceedings and the claims of foreign representatives.
Comity played a role in deciding almost all of the cases, originally under a
territoriality approach, but later under a more balanced pro-recognition
comity approach. Also, over the years, other universality notions such as the
equal distribution of assets and economy of administration began to gain
178 Id. at 630.
179 Idc at 631.
280 Id.
181 Id. at 631-32.
182 In essence, the Clarkson court applied the notion that exceptions to comity should
be narrowly drawn when United States citizens in foreign proceedings were accorded
protection against fundamentally unfair procedures. For a discussion of fundamental
unfairness in the Section 304 setting, see Trautman, supra note 3, at 56. See also Culmer,
25 Bankr. 621, 631 (applying a universality based comity approach, the court quoted
Cornfeld v. Investor Overseas Servs., Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),
which, in turn, had quoted Clarkson about narrowing the exceptions to comity in cases
involving sister common law jurisdictions).
18 See also Cornfeld, 471 F. Supp. 1255 (This case, decided after the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code was passed, but before it became effective, further developed the universality comity
approach and relied on Gebhard and Clarkson.) The district court's decision in Cornfeld
was affirmed by the Second Circuit. 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979).
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some acceptance, as did the notion that local assets should be transferred
abroad in assistance of a primary overseas proceeding. But this patchwork of
cases created an uncertain climate for foreign companies with assets in the
United States, for the creditors of such companies, and for foreign
representatives. 184
In the aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo, but before most of the pro-
recognition comity cases had been decided, many banks suffered large for-
eign exchange losses in connection with currency speculation, or encoun-
tered other financial problems. The insolvency of three of these financial
institutions - Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G.a.A. (Herstatt), Israel-British
Bank (London) Ltd. (IBB), and Banque de Financement, S.A. (Finabank) -
further demonstrated the inadequacy of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act for han-
dling transnational insolvencies and proved to be the catalyst for the reforms
that centered around Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code."8 None of
these banks did business in the United States, but all had assets on deposit in
the United States. Within a period of nine months, each of these three com-
panies was undergoing bankruptcy or arrangement in a bankruptcy court in
the Southern District of New York.
The first of these insolvencies involved Herstatt, 85 a major West German
commercial bank. Since Herstatt had not completed a number of foreign
exchange contracts, it had millions of dollars on deposit in the United States
with its correspondents, including more than US $150 million with Chase
Manhattan Bank (Chase).' 8 ' On June 26, 1974, West German banking
authorities ordered Herstatt to be liquidated." 5 When the news reached New
York earlier that same day, Chase froze Herstatt's account;'89 more than
thirty of Herstatt's creditors, in turn, attached the funds. Chase responded
by filing a federal interpleader action, and shortly thereafter on August 6,
1974, an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against Herstatt to
remove the attachments.19°
At first glance, it would appear that the bankruptcy strategy would be
successful, since the attachments occurred within four months of the filing of
a bankruptcy petition' 91 and since the U.S. Bankruptcy Act provided for
184 See Unger, supra note 3, at 1163; Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes, supra note 3, at 70.
18 Paskay, supra note 14, at 334. See also Unger, supra note 3, at 1163; Note, Section
304, supra note 3, at 547-48.
188 For a more detailed description of the case, see Becker, International Insolvency:
The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A. J. 1290 (1976) [hereinafter Case of Herstatt]; Becker,
Transnational Insolvency Transformed, 29 AM. J. COMp. L. 706 (1981) [hereinafter
Transnational Insolvency]; Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law,
supra note 17; Paskay, supra note 14, at 326-30.
18 See Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law, supra note 17, at 3.
188 Id. at 4.
189 See Becker, Case of Herstatt, supra note 186, at 1291.
190 Id. at 1292-93.
191 Id. at 1293.
[Vol. 9:1
TRANSNA TIONAL BANKRUPTCIES
jurisdiction over nonresident debtors with assets in the United States."
However, a question arose whether the U.S. Bankruptcy Act applied to Her-
statt; specifically, the issue was whether Section 4(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Act, which excluded banking corporations from involuntary bankruptcy,
applied to Herstatt, which was a foreign bank not engaged in the banking
business in the United States.19 "This practically unexplored provision, and
the potential consequences of its interpretation, became the focus of interna-
tional attention."'"4 On November 4, 1974, a bankruptcy judge heard this
issue, but never issued a decision." Given the novelty and complexity of
this issue, the inadequacy of the legal rules, as well as the almost certain
likelihood of appeal, the parties attempted to settle the matter instead.'
Less than four months later the parties reached a settlement," in light of
which the bankruptcy petition was dismissed. 9" An alternative ground of
dismissal was Section 2(a)(22) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act.' This section,
192 U.S. Bankruptcy Act 2(a)(1), 11 U.S.C.A. § I I(a)(1) (West 1991). See supra note
93 and accompanying text.
193 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code addresses this problem in section 109(b)(3). This
section provides that: "[a] person may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title only if
such person is not... (3) a foreign insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative
bank, savings and loan association, building and loan association, homestead association,
or credit union, engaged in such business in the United States." 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(3)
(West 1991). Such banking institutions and insurance companies are also excluded from
Chapter 11 under section 109(d). Id. § 109(d). Such institutions not engaged in such
business in the United States may commence a voluntary case under Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11, but involuntary proceedings may only be commenced against a foreign bank
that is not engaged in such business only under Chapter 7 and only if a foreign
proceeding concerning such bank is pending. Id §§ 301, 303(k).
194 Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law, supra note 17, at 3.
195 Becker, Case of Herstatt, supra note 186, at 1293.
196 Becker, Transnational Insolvency,, supra note 186, at 708-10. Another problem in
Herstatt was that the foreign representative decided "not to subject himself to the
jurisdiction of the U.S. court" because he feared the effects of a full appearance and a
limited appearance was not available at that time under United States law. Gitlin,
Flaschen & Grimes, supra note 3, at 71. This was a recurring problem under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 70. This problem has been resolved under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code by Section 306. 11 U.S.C.A. § 306 (West 1991).
197 Becker, Transnational Insolvency, supra note 186, at 710. For more detail, see id. at
706-10; Becker, Case of Herstatt, supra note 186, at 1294-95; Nadelmann, Israel-British
Bank (London) Ltd. Yet Another Transatlantic Crossing, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 369 (1978)
[hereinafter Israel-British Bank]; Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy
Law, supra note 17, at 1-11.
198 Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law, supra note 17, at 9-10.
19 Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank, supra note 197, at 369. Enacted under the 1962
Amendment to the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, former Section 2(a)(22) authorized a
bankruptcy court to "[e]xercise, withhold, or suspend the exercise of jurisdiction, having
regard to the rights or convenience of local creditors and to all other relevant
circumstances, where a bankrupt has been adjudged bankrupt by a court of competent
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part of the 1962 Amendment to the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, enabled bank-
ruptcy courts to suspend or dismiss proceedings in the United States after
considering the rights or convenience of local creditors and all other
circumstances.
While the Herstatt matter was pending, a bankruptcy case involving IBB
also arose in a bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York, but
before a different bankruptcy judge.' In this case, Judge Galgay, also work-
ing within the rudimentary confines of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, staunchly
supported the universality notions of equality of distribution and economy of
administration set forth in some of the earlier cases and did his best to pro-
mote cooperation in transnational insolvencies.
IBB, a British bank, did not conduct banking operations in the United
States."° It did, however, borrow from and maintain deposits with United
States banks, 2 and in July 1974, IBB was unable to pay back two loans
which became due to two of these banks. 3 The banks responded by
obtaining attachment of IBB's bank deposits with other United States
banks.' Meanwhile, in England on August 2, 1974, IBB vbluntarily com-
menced winding-up proceedings pursuant to Section 222 of the English
Companies Ordinance. The English High Court made a receiving order on
August 6, 1974, a winding-up order on December 2, 1974, and in January
1975, appointed liquidators.' In the interim, on September 23, 1974, IBB
filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in the Southern District of New York
to avoid the preferential attachments of its assets and to ensure that its local
assets "would become available for all general creditors and distributed
among them equally."'
As in Herstatt, the local attaching creditors claimed that IBB was a
"banking corporation" not entitled to protection under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Act and moved to dismiss the petition.'" Unlike in Herstatt, a decision was
reached. Judge Galgay rejected the local creditors' assertion and denied the
motion to dismiss, holding that IBB was not a "banking corporation" under
jurisdiction without the United States." 11 U.S.C.A. § 11(a)(22) (West 1991). See
Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank, supra note 197, at 369.
200 In re Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd., No. 74-B-1322 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23,
1974).
201 In re Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d
509, 510 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub. nom. Bank of the Commonwealth v. Israel-
British Bank (London) Ltd., 429 U.S. 978 (1976) [hereinafter IBB].
202 IBB, 536 F.2d at 510.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 510-11.
205 Id. at 511.
206 In re Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd., No. 74-B-1322 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
1978), Findings of Fact, $ 15 (Jan. 5, 1978) [hereinafter IBB (Findings]), reprinted in
Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank, supra note 197, at 375.
207 IBB, 536 F.2d at 511.
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the U.S. Bankruptcy Act and was therefore not precluded from filing a vol-
untary bankruptcy petition. 2N
The district court reversed and the matter was heard by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which upheld Judge Galgay's original rul-
ing.' The court of appeals held that the exclusion of "banking corpora-
tions" from the U.S. Bankruptcy Act did not apply to foreign banks not
doing business in the United States.210 The court reasoned that banking cor-
porations had been excluded from the U.S. Bankruptcy Act because there
was other legislation, both federal and state, to deal with the liquidation of
such companies.211 However, since these other regulations did not apply to
the liquidation of foreign banks not doing business in the United States,2'2
the court decided:
We can find no convincing reason why a foreign banking corporation,
not licensed to do business in the United States, conducting no sem-
blance of a banking business here, and not under the regulatory supervi-
sion of any state or federal agency, should not qualify for the benefits of
the [U.S.] Bankruptcy Act as a voluntary bankrupt.213
In its ruling the court also stressed that "[tlhe theme of the Bankruptcy
Act is equality of distribution of assets among creditors .... The road to
equity is not a race course for the swiftest. 2'14 The court was especially con-
cerned that if the preferential liens survived, unsecured creditors, including
other American banks that lost the race of the swiftest, would be harmed.215
In other words, rather than protecting the interests of fast-moving local
creditors whose liens would remain if the bankruptcy proceedings were dis-
missed, the court protected the interests of unsecured creditors.1 6
After the court of appeals reversed the order dismissing the petition,
Judge Galgay, of course, still had to work out the framework for enabling
the United States proceeding to assist the primary proceeding abroad. In the
primary proceeding, pursuant to the English Companies Act the creditors
approved a composition plan, which was approved by the English High
Court.217 Thereafter, in December 1976 the English liquidators paid the ini-
tial dividend under the court-approved plan to all creditors of IBB, including
those United States creditors who had filed claims in the United States bank-
208 Id. at 512.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 514-15.
211 Id. at 513-14.
212 Id. at 513, 515.
213 Id. at 513.
214 Id. (citations omitted).
215 Id. at 515.
216 Id.
217 IBB (Findings), supra note 206, 8-10, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British
Bank, supra note 197, at 373-74.
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ruptcy proceeding.218 In the United States, meanwhile, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy for IBB exercised his avoiding powers and amassed for distribution a
bankruptcy estate of several million U.S. dollars.2 19 The question arose of
what to do with those assets. Before Judge Galgay ruled on this matter, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued another decision regarding
transnational insolvency, in the case involving Finabank. ' °
Finabank, a Swiss banking corporation, also not doing business in the
United States, ran into financial difficulties after suffering foreign exchange
losses in December 1974."2 In January 1975 Finabank filed a petition in
Switzerland for a "sursis bancaire," or postponement of maturity.m After
its financial position continued to worsen, Finabank withdrew its "sursis
bancaire" petition and substituted a petition for a "sursis concordataire," or
banking moratorium.' When it became apparent that prospects for reor-
ganization were bleak, Finabank's court appointed commissioners filed a
petition for a "concordat par abandon d'actifs," or court supervised liquida-
tion.' In December 1976 the Swiss Court of Justice ordered Finabank's
liquidation.=
Meanwhile, Finabank was also confronting difficulties in the United
States. Finabank defaulted on its foreign exchange contracts owed to two
New York banks, which responded by securing orders of attachment against
Finabank's assets in the United States.' On May 5, 1975, a few hours
before the expiration of the four-month limitation period for avoiding prefer-
ences under the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, Finabank filed a petition for Chapter
XI protection. 2V
The local creditors with attachments requested the bankruptcy court to
dismiss the petition pursuant to the court's discretion under Section 2(a)(22)
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act and under Bankruptcy Rule 119,m asserting
218 IBB (Findings), supra note 206, 113, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank,
supra note 197, at 373-74.
219 IBB (Findings), supra note 206, 119, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank,
supra note 197, at 373-74.
220 In re Banque de Financement, S.A., 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter
Finabank]; see Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank, supra note 197, at 370,
221 Finabank, 568 F.2d at 913.
2= Id.
= Id.
224 Id.
25 Id.
226 Id. at 914.
' Id.
m9s Enacted in 1973, Bankruptcy Rule 119 was derived from Section 2(a)(22) of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Act, but also applied when a rehabilitation action had been filed abroad.
Former Bankruptcy Rule 119 provided:
When a proceeding for the purpose of the liquidation or rehabilitation of his estate
has been commenced by or against a bankrupt in a court of competent jurisdiction
without the United States, the court of bankruptcy may, after hearing on notice to
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that their rights to be protected were their preferential claims and attach-
ments. The bankruptcy court agreed with this interpretation of local cred-
itors' "rights" and cited the proposition from Disconto Gesellschaft "that a
country 'first protect[s] the rights of its citizens in local property before per-
mitting it to be taken out of the jurisdiction for administration in favor of
those residing beyond its borders.' "' On January 12, 1976, the bankruptcy
court dismissed the petition, citing two reasons: (1) that Finabank was
excluded from seeking relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Act since it was a
"banking corporation;" and (2) that the arrangement could not "comply
with the most elementary and preliminary provisions of the [U.S. Bank-
ruptcy] Act, much less with successful end result" and that "there was
'neither purpose to achieve the desired result nor likelihood of doing so.' "1'
The district court affirmed on the second ground alone, since the Second
Circuit's IBB decision of May 25, 1976 foreclosed the first ground. 2
Finabank appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.m
The court of appeals reversed and in so doing set forth guidelines for the
exercise of a bankruptcy court's discretion to dismiss a Chapter XI peti-
tion.' First of all, the court upheld the right of a foreign debtor to file a
Chapter XI petition to avoid preferences," reasoning that "in view of the
objective of the [U.S.] Bankruptcy Act of insuring equal distribution of
assets among general creditors, such filings should not be discouraged, even
under Chapter XI. The court then stated that Section 2(a)(1) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Act contemplated that foreign debtors could invoke the U.S.
Bankruptcy Act "to obtain an administration of assets located in this coun-
try ancillary to an administration of assets in its foreign domicile."' The
court added that "[Section 2(a)(1)], by providing a jurisdictional underpin-
ning in property located in this country, fosters in international situations
one of the basic purposes of the [U.S. Bankruptcy] Act, i.e. equal distribu-
tion among creditors."' ' 8
the petitioner or petitioners and such other persons as it may direct, having regard to
the rights and convenience of local creditors and other relevant circumstances,
dismiss a case or suspend the proceedings therein under such terms as may be
appropriate.
11 U.S.C. app. rule 119 (1976).
m Finabank, 568 F.2d at 921.
230 Id. at 921 (citing Bankruptcy Court citing Disconto Gesellschaft, 208 U.S. at 570,
582).
231 Finabank, 568 F.2d at 915 (citing Bankruptcy Court) (The Bankruptcy Court was
concerned that Finabank had not submitted a plan or filed a complete list of creditors.)
232 Id.
2M3 Id.
234 Id. at 915-22.
m Id. at 917-19.
236 Id. at 917 (citing IBB, F.2d at 513).
237 Finabank, 568 F.2d at 918.
238 r,4
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In this fashion, the Second Circuit bolstered the universality approach
analysis it had earlier espoused in IBB. Building on Judge Lowell's
reforms,' the court determined that the factors encouraging the coopera-
tion of courts in cross-border insolvencies and furthering the equality of dis-
tribution outweighed parochial protection of United States creditors holding
preferential liens, even if this meant that United States courts would serve in
an ancillary capacity "essentially as an instrument to set aside prefer-
ences."'  Thus, the court explicitly rejected the bankruptcy court's view,
based on Disconto Gesellschaft, that preferential attachments were "rights"
to be protected by the United States courts. In the Second Circuit's view, the
"rights" to be protected were the rights of creditors against being forced "to
participate in foreign proceedings in which their claims will be treated in
some manner inimical to this country's policy of equality." 41
The Second Circuit also stressed the importance of flexibility in handling
international bankruptcies.' As Finabank suggested, there were two possi-
ble ways to coordinate the United States and Swiss proceedings and to
resolve the problem that the Swiss company had never filed a list of creditors
with the United States court:
First, § 2(a)(22) and Rule 119 might be utilized. The bankruptcy court
would take jurisdiction, set aside the attachments, and then suspend the
proceeding and permit the assets located in this country to be adminis-
tered in the Swiss proceeding. Under the second alternative, there
would be a full administration in this country, coordinated with the
Swiss proceeding. The Swiss court would notify the depositors who then
would elect whether to appear in the proceeding here. Pro rata distribu-
tion would be achieved eventually by marshalling of assets in Switzer-
land which would take into account the recoveries of the creditors who
appear here.2 43
While the court drew no conclusions regarding these alternatives and left
them for the bankruptcy court,2' the proposal that the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court should serve in either a primary or ancillary role was later adopted in
Sections 303(b)(4) and 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, respectively. 5
The final principle stressed by the court was economy of administration. 46
The court noted that "Section 2(a)(22) was enacted as an administrative
reform. It was designed to avoid needless duplication of effort by courts and
creditors in those cases where an ancillary proceeding in this country could
I See Lowell, supra note 21.
240 Finabank, 568 F.2d at 918-19.
241 Id. at 921.
242 Id. at 919.
243 Id. at 920.
244 Id. at 920 n. 18.
245 See I1 U.S.C.A. §§ 303(b)(4), 304 (West 1991).
246 Finabank, 568 F.2d at 921.
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be coordinated with or entirely dismissed in favor of a domiciliary proceed-
ing abroad." 7
In both IBB and Finabank, fundamental changes appeared regarding the
appropriate principles for solving transnational insolvency issues. Strikingly,
a discussion of comity does not appear in either decision. The Second Circuit
did not enter the debate about whether territoriality or universality notions
of comity should be applied. Rather, the court stressed that principles of
equality of distribution, international cooperation among bankruptcy courts,
and economy and efficiency of administration were to be applied. The pro-
tection of the interests of local creditors, including unsecured United States
creditors, was to be considered within the framework of these principles.
In Finabank, the Second Circuit's framework of alternatives never had to
be implemented by the bankruptcy court because the parties finally reached
agreement on the liquidation of the New York assets and on the dismissal of
the Chapter XI petition." Finabank thus "ended in the Herstatt-type
style."" 9 But the Second Circuit's framework proved to be helpful to Judge
Galgay in his structuring of the administration of IBB. As mentioned above,
after avoiding the preferential transfers, the trustee in the United States liq-
uidation had amassed several million dollars in the IBB bankruptcy estate
for distribution to creditors.A2° Judge Galgay followed the first alternative
proposed by Finabank in its case - he suspended the United States proceed-
ings and ordered the transfer of these funds to the English liquidators to be
administered by them for the benefit of all creditors of IBB.251 During the
time between the commencement of the winding-up proceedings in England
and Judge Galgay's transfer order years later, the U.S. dollar had risen about
11% as against the British pound sterling,252 and Judge Galgay had to
address the issue of as of what date the currency conversion should be made.
He stressed "[t]hat it is a principle of English law, just as it is of American
bankruptcy law that equality is equity."'  He also relied on Gebhard in
holding that the United Kingdom scheme was binding on all creditors who
filed claims in the United States proceeding and that therefore all foreign
debts would be converted to pounds sterling at the rate of exchange prevail-
ing at the date of the winding up order in the United Kingdom. M4
247 Id.
248 Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank, supra note 197, at 370 n.5.
249 Id.
o See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
21 See In re Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd., No. 74-B-1322 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan
5, 1978), Conclusions of Law, $$ 5-6, (Jan. 5, 1978) [hereinafter IBB (Conclusions)]
reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank, supra note 197, at 381.
25 IBB (Findings), supra note 206, 22-24, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British
Bank, supra note 197, at 377-78.
m IBB (Findings), supra note 206, $ 26, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank,
supra note 197, at 378.
254 IBB (Conclusions), supra note 251, % 1, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British
Bank, supra note 197, at 380.
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In his conclusions of law, Judge Galgay relied on Finabank for a variety of
propositions-equality of distribution, the need for cooperation among
bankruptcy courts in cross-border insolvencies, and economy and efficiency
of administration. First, Judge Galgay noted that Section 2(a)(1) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Act "could be invoked by IBB for the specific purpose of avoid-
ing preferential attachments and to obtain an administration of its assets in
this country ancillary to an administration of its principal assets located in
its foreign domicile - the United Kingdom" and added that "[this] section,
by providing a jurisdictional underpinning in property located in this coun-
try, fosters in international situations one of the basic purposes of the [U.S.]
Bankruptcy Act, i.e. equal distribution among creditors." 20, Next, Judge
Galgay held that Section 2(a)(22) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act and Bank-
ruptcy Rule 119 enabled a bankruptcy court to "exercise its discretion to
dismiss the proceeding, or, after setting aside any preferences to suspend the
proceeding and permit assets located in this country to be administered pur-
suant to the domiciliary proceeding.' ' "5 And third, he also held that Section
2(a)(22) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Rule 119 were enacted
to "avoid needless duplication of effort by courts and creditors" when coor-
dinating an ancillary proceeding in the United States with a primary pro-
ceeding abroad.2 7
Judge Galgay also considered the interests of United States creditors-his
final conclusion of law stated that the relief he was ordering "would have
regard to the rights and convenience of local creditors."'  Judge Galgay
conditioned the turnover of the United States assets to be distributed abroad
on the prepayment of the administration expenses, including the attorneys'
and trustees' fees and expenses. He also conditioned the turnover order on
providing for the payment of a certain priority lien claim.25 9
Judge Galgay's turnover order marked the zenith of the evolution and
growing acceptance of the pre-U.S. Bankruptcy Code universality approach.
By suspending the bankruptcy proceedings in the United States and further-
ing the cooperation with the primary proceeding in the United Kingdom,
Judge Galgay intended that his order:
would avoid litigation and protracted appeals therefrom; would avoid
enormous costs and expenses to this estate; would avoid a further and
undue delay in making a further distribution to all the unsecured credi-
255 IBB (Conclusions), supra note 251, 2, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British
Bank, supra note 197, at 380-81 (citing Finabank, 568 F.2d at 911).
I IBB (Conclusions), supra note 251, $ 3, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British
Bank, supra note 197, at 381 (citing Finabank, 568 F.2d at 911).
157 IBB (Conclusions), supra note 251, 4, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British
Bank, supra note 197, at 381 (citing Finabank, 568 F.2d at 911).
I.' IBB (Conclusions), supra note 251, $ 6, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British
Bank, supra note 197, at 381.
259 1BB, Order 1 1-4 (Jan. 5, 1978); IBB, Order Authorizing Trustee to Turn Over
Funds to U.K. Liquidators and to Pay Administration Claims (Dec. 19, 1978).
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tors of IBB; would preserve the principle of equality of distribution
among all the unsecured creditors of IBB; would avoid needless dupli-
cation of effort by courts and creditors and would prevent this court
and appellate courts, already overburdened, and the litigants from
going through a meaningless and futile exercise.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The transnational aspects of United States insolvency law underwent fun-
damental changes from 1809, when Justice Marshall set forth his strict terri-
toriality language in Harrison, through 1978, when Judge Galgay espoused
many universality principles and closely cooperated with English liquidation
proceedings in IBB.
The early cases applied a territoriality approach, which was primarily
concerned with protecting the interests of local creditors when they con-
flicted with the claims of foreign representatives and cooperating with for-
eign proceedings when they did not. With Gebhard and the writings of Judge
Lowell (which resulted in the amendment to United States bankruptcy law
providing for jurisdiction over non-resident debtors and thereby for the
avoidance of preferential attachments in bankruptcy cases involving non-res-
ident debtors), the universality approach began to emerge. However, in 1895
in Hilton, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a narrow view of comity, and in
1908 in Disconto Gesellschaft, upheld the rights of states to continue to apply
territoriality principles and to prefer the interests of United States creditors
in non-bankruptcy cases involving cross-border insolvency issues.
The courts in Norske Lloyd and Kreuger & Toll began to develop a more
universality-oriented, flexible approach in two insolvency cases involving
disputes between local creditors and foreign representatives. Finally, in the
1970s, many courts showed a greater desire to cooperate in cross-border
insolvencies and the use of the territoriality approach began to give way in a
number of reported cases. Some of these courts followed a pro-recognition
comity approach, as illustrated by Waxman and Clarkson. In contrast, the
Second Circuit in IBB and Finabank more clearly espoused the universality
approach. For example, in IBB, the Second Circuit and Bankruptcy Judge
Galgay took full advantage of Judge Lowell's reform of basing jurisdiction
on the presence of assets in the United States and avoided the preferential
liens of United States creditors, thereby protecting the interests of unsecured
creditors, furthering equality of distribution to creditors worldwide, improv-
ing cooperation among bankruptcy courts in cross-border insolvencies, and
ensuring the economy and efficiency of administration. It is significant that
in his Conclusions of Law in IBB, Judge Galgay resurrected and relied on
Gebhard. Thus, the exception had to a great extent become the norm.
This does not mean, however, that the universality approach had com-
260 IBB (Findings), supra note 206, $ 30, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank,
supra note 197, at 380.
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pletely replaced the territoriality approach. Although Section 304 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code attempted to resolve many of the inadequacies of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Act and to provide guidance for the judiciary in transnational
insolvency matters, courts have interpreted Section 304 inconsistently, and
the debate about the universality and territoriality approaches continues. A
clearer understanding of the evolution in the transnational aspects of United
States insolvency law during the two centuries prior to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 might well assist in the resolution of that debate, and in
the continued development of the universality approach.
